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The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO:
Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for
Further Developments

JOSEPH KELLER∗

Introduction
In today’s increasingly interdependent global society, international
institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing
only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their
processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization
(WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and
democratic participation.1 Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent
than in the arena of dispute settlement.2 The controversy over the acceptance
of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and
non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement

∗

Associate, O'Melveny & Meyers, New York. J.D., University of Michigan Law
School. The author wishes to thank Professor Rob Howse for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1
Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 at 348
(2002); Robert Howse, Membership and its Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and
the Amicus Brief Controversy, Outline/Incomplete Draft; John A. Ragosta,
Unmasking the WTO—Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live up to the
Moniker “World Trade Court”?, 31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739, 756 (2000); Michael
Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in
International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice in
the WTO?.
2
Id.; See also Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Institutional Concerns of an Expanded
Trade Regime: Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy be Made?:
Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 Wid. L. Symp. J. 87 at 91
(2001).
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proceedings.3 This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate
Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.4
Panels and the Appellate Body govern dispute settlement at the
WTO.5 Panels are established by the Dispute Settlement Body, which
consists of all WTO members. Panels are essentially tribunals, and consist of
three or sometimes five experts from different countries who render decisions
in a given trade dispute between member states. Members of a panel are
chosen in consultation with the countries that are parties to a dispute (if the
parties cannot agree, the WTO director-general appoints them). Panelists
serve in their individual capacities and cannot receive instructions from any
government. A party may appeal the ruling of a panel to the Appellate Body.
There are seven members of the Appellate Body, and each member serves a
four-year term. These individuals are experts in the area of trade law and
must not be affiliated with any government. Three members of the Appellate
Body hear each appeal of a panel ruling.
This article argues in favor of increased amicus participation in WTO
dispute settlement and is divided into four parts. Part I briefly examines the
history of Appellate Body decisions concerning amicus briefs. Part II
examines the significant new developments in the Sardines case, including the
acceptance of amicus briefs from governments that are non-parties to a
dispute.6 Part III explains why amicus practice is desirable at the WTO and
analyzes some important procedural suggestions for handling the submission
of amicus briefs. Part IV proposes and evaluates new possibilities for amicus
participation in WTO dispute settlement. These new possibilities include
participation by government agencies and international organizations, and the
emergence of a category of briefs relied upon by the panels and Appellate
Body.

3

See Donald McRae, Trade and the Environment: Competition, Cooperation or
Confusion?, 41 Alberta L. Rev. 745; Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO
Understanding on Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate, 14
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 1223; Duncan B. Hollis , GLOBALIZATION & THE EROSION
OF SOVEREIGNTY IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR LICHTENSTEIN: Private Actors
in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State
Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 235.
4
Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998;
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines
(“Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2002.
5
See www.wto.org for a complete summary of the dispute settlement system at
the WTO as described in the introduction of this article.
6
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines
(“Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2002.
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I. The Evolution of Appellate Body Decisions on Amicus Briefs.
The Appellate Body rendered its first important decision on amicus
briefs in the Shrimp-Turtle case7. In Shrimp-Turtle the governments of India,
Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia protested a United States embargo on shrimp
harvested by a method that harmed sea turtles. The United States attached
three non-governmental organization (NGO) briefs to its appellant’s
submission. The Appellate Body admitted these three amicus briefs as part of
the U.S. submission.8 More importantly, the Appellate Body overruled the
panel’s finding that it did not have authority to accept unattached amicus
briefs. The Appellate Body criticized as too narrow and technical the panel’s
interpretation of the grant in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of a right to seek information.9
Instead the Appellate Body declared that the “authority to seek information is
not properly equated with a prohibition on accepting information which has
been submitted without having been requested by a panel.”10 Therefore
panels do have a right under Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the DSU to accept
amicus briefs, whether or not attached to a member’s submission.11
The next important Appellate Body ruling addressing amicus briefs
made clear that the Appellate Body itself could also consider unsolicited
amicus briefs.12 In Carbon Steel the Appellate Body found power to consider
amicus briefs in Article 17.9 of the DSU and its grant of broad authority to
adopt procedural rules, provided that such rules do not conflict with the DSU
or any covered agreements.13 The Appellate Body explained the nature and
limitations of its power: “Individuals and organizations, which are not
Members of the WTO, have no legal right to make submissions to or to be
heard by the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body has no legal duty to accept
or consider unsolicited amicus curiae briefs submitted by individuals or
organizations, not Members of the WTO.”14 In this manner the Appellate
Body emphasized the discretionary character of amicus participation.

7

Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998.
8
Id. at ¶89.
9
Art. 13.
10
Shrimp-Turtle at ¶108.
11
For a critique of this decision and its method of interpretation, See Josh
Robbins, False Friends: Amicus Curiae and Procedural Discretion in WTO Appeals
under the Hot-Rolled Lead/Asbestos Doctrine, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 317 (2003).
12
Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the
United Kingdom (“Carbon Steel”), WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 10 May 2000.
13
Id. at ¶39.
14
Id. at ¶9.
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The more recent Asbestos case brought new procedural developments
to amicus participation.15 Faced with a number of amicus submissions, and
cognizant of the health and public interest issues inherent in the case, the
Appellate Body adopted, pursuant to Rule 16(1) of the Working Procedures
for Appellate Review, for purposes of the Asbestos appeal only, an additional
procedure to deal with amicus submissions.16 The Appellate Body then
denied all applications for leave to file a written brief, claiming that each
applicant failed to comply sufficiently with the requirements set forth in
paragraph 3 of the Additional Procedure.17
The actions of the Appellate Body caused a great deal of
consternation among both WTO members and those who had requested leave
to file an amicus brief. Applicants denied by the Appellate Body felt insulted
by the statement that none among them had correctly followed a set of simple
procedures.18 Several WTO members felt a similar sense of disgust after the
Asbestos decision, although for entirely different reasons--they disdained the
notion of amicus practice under any circumstances.19 Member governments
objected to amicus participation with more hostility than ever before, and
Egypt called a meeting of the WTO General Council to address the situation.
At that meeting, twenty-four governments criticized the Appellate Body, four
did not criticize the Appellate Body, and only one (the United States)
endorsed the Appellate Body’s action.20 This widespread discontent with the
Appellate Body’s amicus jurisprudence led some to believe that the Appellate
Body was retreating from its policy of accepting amicus briefs. However,
such notions were proven wrong by another Appellate Body ruling expanding
amicus participation in dispute settlement.
II. Expansion of Amicus Practice: Benefits and Dangers of The Sardines
Decision.

15

Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos Containing Products (“Asbestos”), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12
March 2001.
16
Id. at ¶52.
17
Id. at ¶56.
18
See Howse, supra note 1 at 15.
19
See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/M/83 (June 7, 2000). See also Decision by the Appellate Body Concerning
Amicus Briefs, Statement by Uruguay at the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/38,
at 3 (Nov. 22, 2000).
20
Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299 at 348
(2002).
(Citing WTO General Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 22 November 2000, WT/GC/M/60, para. 1 (Jan. 23, 2001).
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Part II of this article (a) explains the Sardines decision; (b) analyzes
the benefits of the Sardines decision; and (c) analyzes problems that might
result from expansion of amicus practice under Sardines.
a. Sardines developments
Recent developments in amicus practice include the Appellate Body’s
decision to accept amicus briefs from governments that have not exercised
their third party rights.21 This development signals an increasingly liberalized
approach to amicus participation in WTO dispute settlement.
The Sardines case involved the submission by WTO member
Morocco of an amicus brief in a dispute between Peru and the European
Communities. Peru’s letter dated 26 July 2002 contended that accepting such
a brief would allow a WTO member to “impermissibly circumvent the DSU”
which “establishes the conditions under which WTO members can participate
as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings.”22 Peru hinged its argument
on Articles 10.2 and 17.4 of the DSU, which govern participation and written
submissions by third parties.23 The Appellate Body responded by reasserting
its discretion to accept amicus briefs and broadening that discretion to include
the acceptance of amicus briefs by WTO members.24 The Appellate Body
reasoned that the existence of an explicit right of WTO members to
participate as third parties in dispute settlement proceedings did not justify
treating members differently from non-members regarding amicus
submissions.25 Addressing the concern that it should not treat non-members
more favorably than members with regard to amicus participation, the
Appellate Body noted: “As we have already determined that we have the
authority to receive an amicus curiae brief from a private individual or an
organization, a fortiori we are entitled to accept such a brief from a WTO
Member, provided there is no prohibition on doing so in the DSU. We find
no such prohibition.”26
The Appellate Body continued its sensible approach, articulated
previously in US-Lead and Bismuth II, of not permitting broad negative
inferences to be drawn from narrowly constructed DSU rules.27 Clearly just
because the Appellate Body has the legal duty to accept submissions from

21

Sardines, supra note 1.
Id.at ¶154.
23
Id. at. ¶ 161.
24
Id. at. ¶157; ¶164.
25
Id. at ¶163.
26
Id. at ¶164.
27
US Lead and Bismuth II, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000.
22
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parties and third parties does not thereby mean that it does not possess the
legal discretion to accept amicus curiae submissions from WTO members.28
The Appellate Body thus determined that acceptance of amicus curiae
briefs filed by members is a matter of discretion, to be determined on a caseby-case basis.29 The Appellate Body reaffirmed its finding in Carbon Steel
that Article 17.9 of the DSU provides broad legal authority for the Appellate
Body to regulate its own procedures.30 It seems appropriate for the Appellate
Body to consider the underlying purposes of WTO law and dispute settlement
in making decisions of this manner. If the Appellate Body finds any amicus
brief objectionable or simply not useful in deciding the dispute, it can choose
not to consider that brief. This discretion will create a balance of interests by
allowing access for amicus submissions while at the same time appropriately
limiting the influence of such submissions.
b. Benefits of the Sardines decision
One benefit of this new development in amicus participation is that it
will allow WTO members to access the Appellate Body in disputes which
may have an impact on them which was not foreseen at the time appropriate
for intervention as a third party. Allowing access at this later time will ensure
that all members with an interest in the dispute have the opportunity to present
their views, subject always to the discretion of the Appellate Body. If the
Appellate Body determines that a member submitting an amicus curiae brief
has an interest that is merely ancillary to the dispute, or not legally cognizable
for whatever reason, it can choose to ignore the submission.
It is also important to note that the significance of Appellate Body
decisions extends beyond the impact nations realize economically through
implementation of particular rulings. Perhaps equally important is the role the
Appellate Body’s decisions play in clarifying the law.31 One scholar has
noted: “complete party control over the scope of appellate legal interpretation
may not serve the interests of clarification of the law. One response has been
for the AB to take a very broad view of who may be a party or third party to a
proceeding (see Bananas).”32 The Appellate Body has now further
supplemented this broad view by allowing members to access a dispute to
which they have not become a third party. Thus the Appellate Body may
exercise discretion to address a new category of legal arguments that may not
28

For an opposing view, see Robbins, supra note 9.
Sardines, supra note 1 at ¶167.
30
Sardines at ¶ 166.
31
DSU 3.2.
32
Robert Howse, Membership and its Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and
the Amicus Brief Controversy, Outline/Incomplete Draft.
29
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otherwise have been addressed in arguments by the parties, third parties, or
other amicus participants. In this respect the Appellate Body’s acceptance of
WTO member amicus briefs is consistent with its role under DSU 3.2
c. Potential problems with expansion of amicus practice under Sardines
One objection to this new development in amicus participation
suggests that allowing greater access for WTO members in this fashion will
facilitate ambush style tactics, with substantively significant legal arguments
strategically held until late in the proceeding. This problem may be
adequately addressed by adopting a set of formal procedures for amicus
participation. One interesting model is the recent proposal of the European
Communities for a new Article to be inserted into the DSU after Article 13.33
This proposal suggests that any person wishing to make an amicus submission
must apply for leave to file within 15 days from the date of the composition of
the panel or within five days from the date of the notice of appeal.34
Additionally the Communication provides that parties and third parties to the
dispute be given ten days from the date of receipt of any amicus curiae
submission to comment on that submission. This ten-day period would
protect the parties and third parties from ambush style tactics. However,
while the 15-day and five-day limits will also serve this function, they seem
too brief for a prospective amicus participant to apply for leave to file a
submission. The interests of the parties and third parties can be protected, and
due process respected, while maintaining a longer window of opportunity for
amicus to decide whether to participate.
Another complaint related to protecting the parties and third parties to
a dispute suggests that amicus participation of any sort tends to favor
developed countries.35 This argument insists that NGOs tend to be located in
wealthier countries and therefore will be sympathetic to the views of those
nations. While this notion is far from a proven point, it is worth examining
the effect participation as amicus by WTO members might have on this
debate.36 Will this new member amicus participation alleviate that perceived
problem; or is it an unfair burden on developing countries?

33

Contribution of the European Communities and its Member States to the
Improvement of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Communication from
the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, 13 March 2002.
34
Id. at ¶2.
35
See McRae, supra note 3.
36
See John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO—Access to the DSB System: Can
the WTO DSB Live up to the Moniker “World Trade Court?”, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L
BUS. 739, 756 (2000).
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Developing countries may view member amicus participation as
another weapon that developed countries may use to impose undue costs on
and tax the minimal resources of lesser developed countries (LDCs). On the
other hand, LDCs may in some cases not see opportunities to intervene as
third parties as a result of their lack of resources. When this occurs, opening
the door for participation at a later date as amicus may be an advantage to
LDCs. In any case, participation by members as amicus should lead to better
information, both factually and legally, for use by panels or the Appellate
Body in deciding disputes.
Another angle ties amicus participation to questions and concerns
about lobbying. Viewed positively, member amicus participation generally
allows those members without political connections or lobbying money
greater access to the dispute settlement process. This fairness argument
makes sense, but can be countered by another view that suggests that
expanding amicus participation could lead to more burdensome lobbying by
private organizations. For example, a private organization might feel the
panel or Appellate Body would take its arguments more seriously if they
appeared in a brief submitted by a WTO member.37 This type of lobbying
could lead to an unfair advantage gained by those with powerful lobbying
efforts, such as large corporations with an economic interest in a dispute. In
turn this advantage could act to skew the legal inquiry substantively away
from broader policy concerns and towards the specific economic interests at
stake.
III. The Case for Amicus Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement.
Before moving on to discuss possible future developments in amicus
participation, it is important to make the case for the benefits of amicus
participation as it currently exists. Part III of this article addresses the proamicus arguments most frequently mentioned by scholars, including (a) the
need to address the democracy deficit at the WTO (meaningfulness of access
for groups or individuals whose rights and interests are at stake) and (b) the
concern over transparency.38 Section (c) of Part III addresses procedural
mechanisms for handling amicus submissions and analyzes objections to
37

See Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent
Developments in International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private
Organizations a Voice in the WTO?, 12 Transnational Law 427, 443 (1999).
Laidhold discusses the negative effects of private parties lobbying WTO members to
join in disputes as a third party.
38
See Maura Blue Jeffords , TURNING THE PROTESTER INTO A PARTNER
FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE CONSULTATION
BETWEEN THE WTO & NGOs, 28 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 937; David J. Bederman,
National Security: Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign
Policy, 50 Emory L.J. 717 (2001).
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amicus participation, including concerns over confidentiality, due process and
fairness to lesser developed countries.39
a. Democracy Deficit
Many scholars have identified a so-called democracy deficit at the
WTO.40 This notion complains that the WTO fails to give dispute settlement
access to those parties whose interests are often at stake in a dispute. As only
states have standing, NGOs, corporations, other private groups and
individuals have no recognized method for influencing decisions that impact
them.41 This denial of participation has been termed a democracy deficit and
is often cited as a problem that can be alleviated in part through amicus
participation.42
WTO members have often objected to amicus participation on the
grounds that it is inappropriate to a system designed to give rights only to
state members.43 This criticism ignores the practical reality of the dispute
settlement process: “There can be little doubt that non-state actors have long
played very significant—albeit informal and unofficial—roles in both the
legislative and dispute resolution processes.”44 The Kodak-Fuji dispute and
the Reformulated Gas dispute are examples of disputes that are only
nominally between WTO parties, and “can be more fruitfully understood as
components of complex international corporate battles.”45 Therefore the
WTO dispute settlement system can be understood as formally granting rights

39

Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and Souther
Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute
Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles, 30 Ecology L.Q. 113 (2003).
40
Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governannce and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J.
303 (2004).
41
Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The
WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 Kan. L. Rev. 823
(2002).
42
Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments
in International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice
in the WTO? 12 Transnat’l Law 427 (1999).
43
See Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting, WTO Doc.
WT/DSB/M/83 (June 7, 2000). See also Decision by the Appellate Body Concerning
Amicus Briefs, Statement by Uruguay at the General Council, WTO Doc. WT/GC/38,
at 3 (Nov. 22, 2000).
44
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Civil Society at
the WTO: The Illusion of Inclusion?, 7 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 275 at 281 (2001).
45
Id. at 282.
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only to states, while informally recognizing the interests of large and powerful
corporations.46
By contrast, NGOs often face a more difficult battle in getting their
views before the panels or Appellate Body. The opponents of amicus
participation would have the interests of NGOs channeled exclusively through
governments. But NGOs need independent participatory access because
governments cannot always represent their interests. The goals of the NGO or
other private organization may directly conflict with the government’s
position, or may contain some legal arguments and policy concerns not
adopted by the government. For example, the interests of a consumer group
NGO would not be likely to coincide with the government’s interest in a case
challenging a protectionist measure of that government.47 NGO access is
even more important for NGOs from developing countries that may not have
the resources to participate effectively in WTO dispute settlement.48
Additionally, the situation could be even bleaker for NGOs located in nations
not yet admitted as WTO members.49 These NGOs would find access to
WTO dispute settlement obstructed by the status of their home nation.
WTO dispute settlement may also be enhanced by the participation of
individuals. WTO legal provisions contain reference to the GATT/WTO
purpose of protecting the interests of individuals.50 The panel in the S. 301
case considered these individual interests relevant to the interpretation of
treaty provisions:
However, it would be completely wrong to consider that the
position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO
matrix. Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to
flow as a result of the acceptance of various disciplines under
the GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual
economic operators in the national and global market places.
The purpose of many of these disciplines, indeed one of the
primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce

46

Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the
WTO, 1 J. of Int’l Econ. L. 433 (1998).
47
Charnovitz, supra note 9 at 324.
48
Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24
Fordham Int’l L.J. 173, 205-206 (2000).
49
Id.
50
See the Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
which contains references to “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment
and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand.”
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certain market conditions which would allow this individual
activity to flourish.51
The panel sets forth a teleological interpretation of both the Preamble
to the WTO Agreement and Article 3.2 of the DSU.52 The panel interprets
DSU Art. 3.2 as containing a purpose to protect individual economic actors:
“The security and predictability in question are of “the multilateral trading
system.” The multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of
States, but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators. The lack of
security and predictability affects mostly these individual operators.”53
Recognizing the salient reality of the individual interests at stake, the panel
notes that the complaints of individual economic actors often trigger dispute
settlement proceedings, thereby producing what the panel refers to as
“indirect effect”.54 Put another way, violation of a member state’s rights often
flows directly from the injury to individual economic actors within that state.
By bringing suit to enforce its rights a member state provides an indirect route
for individual economic actors to remedy their injuries.
The panel employs a method of interpretation whereby panels and the
Appelate Body may recognize the significance of individual interests without
compromising the fundamental nature of the WTO as a system granting rights
only to state members.55
Amicus practice is another means of providing indirect access to
individual interests, the protection of which is already well understood as
fundamental to the achievement of the underlying purposes and goals of the
WTO.56 Allowing these individuals to influence their fate through amicus
participation would help alleviate democracy deficit.
The Hormones dispute between the United States and the European
Communities is a classic example of a case directly affecting individuals.57
European consumers of beef, in their individual capacity, will be affected by a
decision calling for a removal of the trade barrier against hormone treated
beef (if the removal is ever actually effectuated). One could argue that the
consumer may choose to boycott any hormone treated beef, but in reality this
51

Report of the Panel, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
(“S. 301”), WT/DS152/R at ¶7.73, 22 December 1999.
52
Id. at ¶7.74-7.75.
53
Id. at ¶7.76, (quoting DSU art. 3.2).
54
Id. at ¶7.77-7.78.
55
See Howse, supra note 16.
56
See S. 301, supra note 28.
57
Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted 16 January 1998.
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may prove extremely difficult and burdensome. Imagine as a matter of
necessity inquiring each time a person enters a supermarket, butcher shop, or
perhaps more problematic, a restaurant, and demanding to know the source
and character of all beef being sold. A general boycott at the wholesaler level
would be inconsistent with the goals of a decision condemning the ban and
might raise antitrust issues.
Furthermore, some individuals may be powerless to protect
themselves from the effects of a WTO ruling in a case such as Hormones. For
example, children are known to be particularly susceptible to the effects of
food borne illnesses. Although unrelated to hormone treated beef, the E-coli
problem experienced in the United States demonstrates this phenomenon.
Who will represent the interests of children if their parents fail to recognize a
danger? In this scenario the activities of NGOs might interact with the
interests of a class of individuals who would otherwise be powerless to
represent themselves. It seems sensible to allow NGOs to participate as
amicus, rather than leaving such public interest issues solely to the discretion
of the governments involved in a dispute. As has been noted by many
scholars, one common and prominent critique of the WTO system complains
of too much reliance on governments and economic theory to protect the
public interest.58 Such a problematic imbalance is particularly troublesome
when health issues are at stake.
This imbalance also reaches the tension between environmental and
economic interests. The failure of states to adequately balance these
competing concerns makes amicus participation particularly desirable. One
WTO critic has noted that “critics argue that trade panels, by their very
designation, place trade values above other more important social issues…an
international body will have supremacy without the broader world view in
mind.”59 In this view, the potentially narrow focus of a panel is an
institutional failure that can be remedied in part by allowing outside experts
with divergent opinions access to the process.
More liberal amicus participation will better serve the public interest
for disputes involving especially novel or complex industries. An intellectual
property dispute might involve complicated issues that NGOs are particularly
well suited to explicate. For example, “Sierra Club or the ASCAP spend
more time and money researching their particular area of interest than does

58

See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First
Sight, 95 A.J.I.L. 489 (2001).
59
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Institutional Concerns of an Expanded Trade
Regime: Where Should Global Social and Regulatory Policy be Made?: Unfriendly
Actions: The Amicus Brief Battle at the WTO, 7 Wid. L. Symp. J. 87 at 91 (2001).
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the U.S. government.”60 The same could be said for NGOs with any number
of special areas of environmental expertise. While these NGO’s undoubtedly
may introduce their own prejudices into their arguments, the panels and
Appellate Body are sophisticated enough to filter this information for its core
usefulness. In these especially difficult cases, more complete information
through amicus participation can lead to better dispute settlement and will
enhance the efficiency of the WTO.61
b. Transparency
Another major critique of the WTO focuses on the lack of
transparency to the dispute settlement process.62 Transparency in
international law as a concept can be traced as far back as the philosopher
Kant’s essay “Perpetual Peace.”63 Kant writes: “all actions that affect the
rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with
publicity.”64 Kant’s writing reflects the high value placed on maintaining
openness in judicial processes that affect the public interest. His idea implies
that men will recognize unfairness or abuse of process if that process is held
open to scrutiny. It seems natural to insist that transparency improve at the
WTO in order to avoid any such systemic risk of unfairness and to stimulate
better policy discussions amongst both members and non-members. One
could argue that those outside the WTO system have an inherent right to
compete, with full information, in the marketplace of ideas to influence
decisions that will inevitably impact them. At the very least, the improvement
of transparency will reduce suspicion of and increase public confidence in the
WTO system.
Comparing the WTO system to the American dispute resolution
system sheds light on why the WTO system’s lack of transparency is
particularly problematic. United States courts fit into a constitutional scheme
that includes “transparent procedures for staffing them, an active practice of
dissent, extensive openness to amicus curiae, and the means to overrule
judicial decisions that do not depend, as in the WTO, on achieving political
consensus.”65 The extraordinary power of the Appellate Body is not subject
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to the same checks and balances as the courts of the United States. Nor is the
Appellate Body under the microscope of public opinion in the same way as
the Supreme Court of the United States. Decisions of the Appellate Body, at
least in theory, are not subject to the same political or public oversights, and
its inaccessibility seems consequently even more dangerous.
One method for addressing the transparency problem at the WTO
would call for greater participation of amicus in WTO dispute settlement.
Amicus participation is consistent with the ideas of Kant, who points out that
governments should consult philosophers in matters of international relations,
and that philosophers have a moral obligation to participate where it is not
expressly forbidden.66 In the modern context, the NGOs or other amicus
participants may be characterized as the philosophers, who will and should
participate where not forbidden.67 Unlike member states of the WTO, NGOs
tend to publicize their legal theories and views regarding disputes with which
they are involved. Consequently, engaging NGOs in the WTO dispute
settlement process will often create the publicity esteemed by Kant and sought
by WTO critics. If an amicus brief, filed by an NGO in a WTO proceeding, is
posted by that NGO on its website and circulated among academics and other
interested NGOs, transparency will be increased with respect to the legal
issues and facts addressed in the brief.
Consider also the reciprocal relationship between greater transparency
and amicus participation. Just as participation of amicus would help engender
greater transparency, greater transparency of process (such as opening dispute
hearings to the public) would create more meaningful access for amicus.
Analogizing to Kant’s model, participation by philosophers will be facilitated
by an opening of the process to public view. This in turn will reduce public
concerns about the integrity of the process.
c. Objections to Amicus Participation and Proposed Procedural
Mechanisms Addressing these Objections.
While participation of amicus in WTO dispute settlement will help
with the problems of democracy deficit and transparency, many critics have
noted that due process, confidentiality and fairness to LDCs are legitimate
concerns of amicus participation.68 The best method for addressing these
concerns is to create a set of procedures for amicus participation designed to
protect the interests of the parties and third parties to the dispute.
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As discussed earlier in connection with the Sardines case, the
European Communities (EC) suggested a set of procedures to be inserted after
Article 13 of the DSU.69 The first paragraph of the EC Communication
provides that unsolicited amicus submissions must be directly relevant to the
factual and legal issues under consideration by the panel or Appellate Body.70
In addition, paragraph 3(d) requires the amicus applicant to demonstrate the
direct interest that the applicant has in the dispute and paragraph 3(f) requires
the applicant also to show why it would be desirable for the panel or
Appellate Body to grant the applicant leave to file a submission.71 These
provisions serve a gate keeping purpose and prevent the feared deluge of
amicus submissions from affecting the parties to a dispute. This will be
particularly relevant to LDCs that may not have resources to address a
multitude of amicus submissions.
A more progressive approach to developing amicus practice might
also include a list of criteria especially relevant to the values and goals of
amicus participation. For example criteria might be found in “the broader
objectives of the WTO as expressed in the preamble to the WTO Agreement,
including the reference to sustainable development, and the requirement for
positive measures to ensure that developing countries secure a commensurate
share in the growth of international trade.”72 These criteria should be
incorporated into the procedures for amicus participation. Procedures could
endorse these considerations as being of primary importance in amicus
participation, while specifically not closing the door on participation by
amicus curiae representing corporate interests. Adoption of such value
preferences into procedural rules would encourage participation by NGOs
with a public interest motive.
The EC Communication further addresses these types of concerns by
requiring an application for leave to file an amicus brief to contain a
“description of the applicant, including a statement of the membership and
legal status of the applicant, the general objectives pursued by the applicant,
the nature of the activities of the applicant, and the sources of financing of the
applicant.”73 The panel or Appellate Body in a dispute can use these criteria
to screen applicants and deny the applications of those deemed inappropriate.
Prospective amicus participants that are funded indirectly by a party or third
party, or by powerful corporations, whose interests are known to coincide
69

Communication from the European Communities, supra note 17.
Id. at ¶1.
71
Id. at ¶3.
72
Gabriele Marceau & Matthew Stillwell, Practical Suggestions for “Amicus
Curiae” Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 155 at 179
(2001).
73
Communication from the European Communities, supra note 17 at ¶3(c).
70

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

464

[Vol. 33:3

with a party, will at least be compelled to disclose the true nature of their
interest in the dispute.
One could make the argument that NGOs from developed countries
tend to represent a national or regional interest whether or not they receive
any funding or support from their governments. These NGOs are better
funded due to their location in a particular wealthy area, and thus their
participation may create a bias in favor of their home region. While biases
may be created, the EC procedures would allow the Appellate Body or panels
the discretion, under a standard of full information and disclosure, to
determine whether or not amicus participation would create unfairness in
particular situations. This should control the potential abuse of the amicus
process by wealthier parties on a case-by-case basis, and provide for greater
likelihood of success for amicus participants that are purely public interest
NGOs.
Even in the absence of procedural mechanisms for controlling amicus
participation, the objection to amicus practice as favoring corporate interests
or tipping the balance of power unfairly in any particular direction can be met
with the answer that it is up to the members of a panel or Appellate Body to
monitor this potential unfairness. As Professor Mavroidis points out: “And
yes, many friends of the court are rather friends of themselves. They do not
care about systemic issues, they do not care for the truth. They want to sell a
message. But this is not an argument against accepting amicus curiae briefs.
This is an argument in favour of selecting properly the members of a court.”74
Put another way, the character and motivation of the amicus participants will
be less important than the judicial caution exercised by panel or Appellate
Body members in attaching weight to particular amicus briefs. Therefore
concerns over the effects of amicus practice lend weight to other proposals for
reform of the WTO dispute settlement process, including the call for
developing a permanent panel.75 Additionally, Mavroidis points out that
Article 13 of the DSU provides the mandate for panels to seek out whatever
information they may deem necessary to resolving the dispute, regardless of
whether such information has been pleaded by a party.76
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Looking at the concerns about prejudice to LDCs from a more
pragmatic perspective, the idea that amicus practice benefits the wealthier
nations is even more dubious. Notably, these powerful players “have access
to politicians, and therefore to the servants of politicians, delegates and
ambassadors; they have access as well, or the resources to buy access, to
lawyers, consultants and lobbyists who can make their views effectively
known in the Geneva community.”77 With this arsenal of tactics at their
disposal, why would the most powerful WTO members even bother with
amicus submissions? Because amicus briefs are one of the most effective
methods of participation only for members who do not possess the resources
mentioned above, and therefore do not enjoy the benefits of lobbying or
employing teams of sophisticated attorneys. In any case, the EC procedures
would help break down what little remains of the objection to amicus
participation on grounds of its prejudice to LDCs.
As noted earlier, some of the time constraints proposed by the EC
seem too short. These include Paragraph 5, which provides that an applicant
granted leave to file a submission must make its submission to the panel
within 15 days from the date of receipt of notification and to the Appellate
Body within 3 days of such date.78 The three-day window for submissions to
the Appellate Body seems too short a time for an amicus participant to file a
brief. In order to meet such a deadline an amicus participant would probably
need to have the brief worked out prior to receipt of permission to file.
Expanding the time period to file would not be detrimental to the parties.
The EC Communication might also benefit from a provision
concerning confidentiality. It is not clear exactly why confidentiality would
be a major concern in amicus practice, but a provision detailing the
obligations of amicus participants would help abate criticism. A procedure
could be developed whereby any amicus participant would be required to sign
a letter indicating that certain specified categories of private information it
learns through its participation in the dispute would remain confidential.
Penalties for violating the provisions could include denial of any future
opportunity to apply for leave to file as amicus.
Additionally, the notice requirement contained in paragraph 7 of the
EC Communication could be more detailed.79 A new procedure could be
adopted specifically requiring service on all parties and third parties, and
requiring such service to contain the disclosure information mandated in
paragraph 3.80 Beyond that new procedures could require any amicus
77
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submissions to be made available to all WTO members upon request, as done
under Article 18 of the DSU with non-confidential summaries of parties’
submissions to WTO dispute settlement.81 Translations might also be
provided to parties in appropriate circumstances.82
IV. The Future of Amicus Practice at the WTO: Government Agencies,
International Organizations, and Briefs Relied Upon
After the Sardines decision, the question arises as to how far the
WTO’s expanding amicus practice will extend. Now that the Appellate Body
has reasserted its discretion to accept amicus briefs and expanded amicus
participation to include acceptance of briefs by WTO members, it is not
difficult to envision a variety of other possibilities. Part IV of this article will
examine (a) the possibility of acceptance of amicus briefs from government
organs; (b) acceptance of amicus briefs from international organizations; and
(c) the emergence of a new category of briefs “relied on” by the adjudicating
body.
a. Government Agencies
If WTO member states may submit amicus briefs, perhaps organs of
those governments should be allowed to submit amicus briefs as well. To
examine this question it may be useful to return to the discussion earlier
regarding the special desirability of amicus briefs in disputes with significant
public health components. For example the Hormones dispute, or imagine
instead a dispute involving a protectionist measure employed by the European
Union to prevent the shipment of American beef tainted by E-coli. A
Canadian government agency might wish to file an amicus brief in such a
hypothetical dispute between the United States and the European Union.
Suppose that the Canadian government agency that is equivalent to the USDA
knew of severely unsafe conditions in American meatpacking plants. These
conditions might include unsafe line speeds and other unsanitary slaughtering
conditions leading inevitably to fecal contamination in the meat. Through its
expertise with monitoring its own similar industry, the Canadian agency
might be able to provide useful expert information regarding industry practice
and minimal safety standards necessary to prevent outbreaks of food
poisoning.
A filing by this agency independent of its government might be
necessary in order to get its views before the panel or Appellate Body. The
81
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Canadian government might choose for political reasons to not endorse the
views of this agency. If that were the case, the agency, if led by independent
minded individuals, and if permissible under Canadian law, could go forward
with its filing as amicus curiae. This would be desirable in order to have the
fullest and best information available to a panel or Appellate Body, especially
in a dispute involving an industry the Canadian government agency is perhaps
uniquely qualified to comment on.
Other, more grisly scenarios are imaginable which a different
Canadian government agency might be qualified to analyze. Continuing with
our hypothetical case, a Canadian government agency responsible for
workplace safety standards might have useful information to share with a
panel or Appellate Body. Suppose this government agency knows that certain
practices, employed by United States slaughterhouses, are inherently unsafe
for workers. Statistics maintained by this agency regarding the correlation
between line speeds at slaughterhouses and worker injury rates might be
useful to a panel. These statistics might show an alarming rate of serious
injury resulting in deep flesh wounds to workers, from which human blood
may contaminate the meat supply. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle tells a truthbased tale wherein a slaughterhouse worker falls into a vat of burning animal
fat and is incinerated.83 The worker’s flesh is then incorporated into sausage.
While this is an extreme example, it illustrates a relevant point about the
relationship between workplace safety in slaughterhouses and meat
contamination. Any such information held by a Canadian government agency
would be scientifically relevant to the same industry practices in the United
States and would involve directly the serious public interest issues in the case.
Other types of government agencies might also become involved in
filing amicus briefs with the WTO. This could occur in any situation where
the government agency wished to express a view not joined in or endorsed by
the executive branch of its government. Legislative committees could enter
the debate in this manner, subject of course to the internal jurisdictional laws
of their nations. The United States Senate Finance Committee is one potential
candidate for amicus participation. The expertise of a committee and its
workforce of attorneys and advisors could prove helpful to panels or the
Appellate Body. There is also a plausible argument that a legislative
committee would express views more accountable to public opinion than
those of the executive branch. The U.S. Trade Representative, for example,
has been accused of being used as a tool for corporate interests.84 Although
all elected officials have ties to corporate interests and campaign contributors,
involving another branch of government would expand the field of interests
represented and might include ideas not otherwise presented.
83
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b. International Organizations
The participation of international organizations presents another
interesting possibility for amicus practice. A committee of the United Nations
might play a useful role in dispute settlement as amicus curiae. The
multinational character of a U.N. committee would make its participation
uniquely desirable. Arguably a group of individuals composing a committee
should not represent their individual governments or corporate interests.
Instead they could act as independent legal experts with no cognizable interest
in the case. For example, U.N. legal experts could file an amicus brief in a
case involving principles of treaty interpretation. This could have the
beneficial effect of broadening the scope of legal principles and interpretative
methods relied upon by panels and the Appellate Body. International
organizations could pursue a course often advocated by NGOs, namely
pushing the WTO towards a more open regime through amicus participation.
NGO participation tends to focus on non-trade law values such as
environmental conservation, as evidenced by NGO celebration of the
Appellate Body’s review of international environmental instruments in
interpreting GATT Article XX in Shrimp-Turtle.85 Participation of
prestigious international organizations might increase the weight given by the
Appellate Body to arguments relying on soft international legal sources such
as those discussed in Shrimp Turtle. Further, invoking the values enshrined in
the WTO preamble, such as sustainable development, might also seem a more
solid argument if advocated by international organizations in addition to
NGOs.
Would expanding amicus participation to international organizations
create any additional fairness concerns? In some cases, LDCs may have a
legitimate complaint about reliance on institutions such as the IMF. Professor
Howse expressed concern over the India case, and the broader deference to
views of the IMF on development and macroeconomic policy.86 Potentially,
the Appellate Body might give more weight to an amicus brief filed by the
IMF than to a brief filed by an environmental NGO. While troubling
possibilities do exist, due process considerations would be respected in the
same manner as with any other amicus participant. Procedures as discussed
earlier in this paper, would apply equally to all amicus participants. Judicial
caution would of course be exercised in determining the role of amicus
participation in any given dispute. Discretion should remain the rule;
standing itself should not be granted. Opening the WTO to even more amicus
participation should serve the function of reducing democracy deficit and
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increasing transparency. If properly monitored it should not create any
dangerous burdens on the WTO dispute settlement process or on parties in
their individual capacity.
c. Briefs Relied On
Another matter of concern to the future of amicus participation is the
extent to which amicus briefs are actually considered in dispute settlement. A
long history of difficulty surrounds the attempt to convince the Appellate
Body or panels to consider or rely on amicus briefs.87 As mentioned earlier in
this paper, in the Asbestos case the Appellate Body rejected all applications
for leave to file an amicus brief, on the grounds of failure to follow a set of
simple procedures laid out in an Appellate Body Communication. This
inexplicable decision was sent out by form letter, without any further
explanation. 88
Fortunately not all amicus briefs have been met with such a dismissive
response. In a compliance proceeding, one panel appeared to have relied to
some extent on an amicus brief.89 More recently, the Appellate Body decided
to consider some of the arguments of Morocco in Sardines. These
developments, especially Sardines, reflect a change in attitude among the
Appellate Body and/or panelists toward the usefulness of amicus briefs. The
emergence of a new category of briefs “relied upon” by the Appellate Body
would diminish the criticism of amicus practice as an insignificant issue.90
Acceptance of briefs from governments, government agencies and
international organizations should facilitate a stronger and more meaningful
role for amicus participants.
CONCLUSION
The struggle for meaningful access to WTO dispute resolution for
non-members will continue. Great strides have been made. The Appellate
Body has established that both panels and the Appellate Body have the legal
authority to accept and consider amicus submissions.91 Permissible amicus
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participants have expanded to include not only NGOs and individuals but also
WTO members.92 Other possibilities for government agencies and
international organizations need to be explored.
This article suggests procedures whereby amicus participation might
be regulated (notably by a group originally opposed to amicus practice).93
Nevertheless, numerous hurdles to meaningful participation remain. Many
WTO members will undoubtedly continue to complain about the Appellate
Body’s expanding acceptance of amicus briefs. Complaints about unfairness
to LDCs, due process, confidentiality, and other issues will continue to
permeate the debate. Some would claim that the integrity of the process is at
stake. They are correct; and that integrity is best served by expanding, not
reducing, amicus participation in WTO dispute settlement.
This expansion will insure that the public attains some basic
measure of access to an institution that greatly affects the world economy, and
therefore individuals everywhere. The principles of democratic participation
and transparency will best be served by developing a set of procedural rules to
insure that due process is respected and the rights of WTO members are not
threatened. Once achieved such a procedural mechanism should eliminate a
great majority of the fairness concerns raised by critics of amicus
participation. Therefore it seems prudent for WTO Members to meet and
negotiate these procedures, using the European Communities’ model as a
starting point. The Appellate Body may then continue to develop its amicus
jurisprudence in a liberal fashion, with a set of procedural rules firmly in
place.
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